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SAM. R. MOSLEY, Respondent, v. AI·mEN FARMS CO~I· 
PANY (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[la, Ib] Streets - Injuries Caused by Obstructions - Evidence-
Sufficiency.-In a city employee's action against a milk com-
pany for injuries resulting from being thrown to the sidewalk 
when his mowing machine collided with milk crates which 
were hidden by weeds between the sidewalk and the property 
line, the evidence sustained a finding that defendant was neg-
ligent in piling the crates on a parking near the sidewalk and 
in leaving them unguarded and unattended for at least a 
month, where the crates which caused the accident were 
directly across the sidewalk from the. piled crates, and the 
court was justified in deciding that defendant should have 
anticipated or foreseen that the crates might become scattered. 
[2] Negligence-Knowledge of Danger.-One test for determining 
the issue of negligence is whether a person of ordinary pru-
dence should have foreseen or anticipated that someone might 
be injured by his action or nonaction. 
[8] Id. - Questions of Law and F&et - Exercise of Oare. - An. 
actor'!; conduct must always be gauged in relation to all the 
other material circumstances surrounding it, and if such other 
circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
questioned conduct falls within or without the bounds of ordi-
nary care, such doubt must be resolved as a matter of fact 
rather than of law. 
[4] Id. - Proximate Cause - Intervening Causes.-An intervening 
agency does not break the chain of causation where what 
occurred was reasonably foreseeable and should have been 
anticipated. 
(5) Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Proximate Cause.-The issue 
of proximate cause is essentially one of fact. 
[6] Id. - Proximate Cause - Intervening Oauses.-An intervening 
agency· will not always relieve a defendant of responsibility 
for an injury. (Overruling Schwa,.t. v. Oalifo,.nia Gas If Elec-
[2] See 19 Oal.Jur. 563, 583; 38 Am.Jur. 678. 
[3] See 19 Cal.Jm. 719, 723; 38 Am.Jur. 1041. 
[5] See 19 Ca1.Jur. 732; 38 Am.Jur. 1056. 
McX. Dig. References: [11 Streets, §!JO; [2] Negligenee, §25; 
[3] Negligence, § 150; [4, 6) Negligence, § 16; (5) Negligence, 
fl5l.. 
.... 
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'ric Corp.) 163 Cal. 398, 12!i P. 1044, and disnpl'),()\"jng of 
Solomon 11. Red flit"", Lllm 1ler Co" 56 CnI.Ap!'. 7-4:!, 20(i P. 4!)8, 
and Royal Insurance Co. 11. Mazzei, 50 Cal.App.2d 54!), ]2:1 P. 
2d 586, in so far as they approve thl' Schwartz casp.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
San Diego County. Robert B. Burch, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed. 
Monroe & McInnis for Appellant. 
Johnson & Johnson, E. L. Johnson and C. Ashley John-
son for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment award-
ing damages to plaintiff for personal injuries suffered in a 
fall when he was dislodged from a tractor which collided 
with some milk crates owned by defendant. The case was 
tried before the court without a jury. 
The injury occurred in National City on Highland Avenue, 
a north-south street about 25 feet south of its intersection 
with 10th Street, an east-west street. Highland A venue is a 
paved street. There is a curb along the west side thereof. 
Adjacent to the curb on the west and parallel therewith is an 
unpaved strip 8% feet wide, which is commonly called the 
parking. Next to the parking is a 5-foot paved sidewalk. 
Along the west side of the paved sidewalk and between it and 
the property line there is a 2-foot unpaved strip. The lot 
fronting on Highland A venue at the point in question is va-
cant. A school ground is located on the west side of Highland 
A venue commencing at the northwest corner of the intersec-
tion of Highland and 10th Street and extending north for a 
block. A tree stands in the parking about 25 feet south of 
10th Street. There is considerable traffic on the sidewalk 
on Highland A venue. 
Defendant for a' year prior to the accident had been in the 
retail milk business in National City, and during the course 
thereof, its employees, without authority or right, piled milk 
crates containing empty milk bottles on the parking about 
three feet south of the tree. About a month prior to the acci-
dent defendant ceased to do business in National City, leaving 
/ 
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about eighteen crates Unattended and unguarded at the ahoyc 
mentioned place. The crates were about 2 feet 10llg by 11/.l 
feet wide by 12 to 14 inches high, and were usually stacked 
3 or 4 high. The 2-foot strip adjacent to the sidewalk was 
grown up with weeds and wild oats to a height of 2% to 3 feet. 
Some time prior to the accident, according to the findings of 
the trial court, two of the crates became "displaced, and 
hidden in the aforesaid growth of weeds in the space between 
the cement walk and the property line and across the five foot 
pavement from where the' pile of the defendant's crates was -
kept and stacked. It is not in evidence that any agent of 
defendant moved said boxes." The two crates were directly 
across the sidewalk from the main pile 011 the parking. Prior 
to the accident one of defendant's drivers had seen glass from 
broken bottles on the 2-foot strip or nearby. 
The court also found that plaintiff, an employee of National 
City, while engaged in mowing the weeds along Highland 
Avenue at the direction of his employer, and using a tractor 
therefor, drove in a northerly direction "on the cement walk, 
and at times to put the left wheels of this rubber tired tractor 
over into the aforesaid two foot space; it is true that while so 
operating said tractor, plaintiff, in order to avoid the pile 
of boxes or crates. operated and ran the aforesaid tractor 
upon one or more of the boxes so hidden in the aforesaid 
two foot space, and that thereby the aforesaid tractor was 
suddenly, and without warning, lifted from the ground and 
tilted at an angle which caused plaintiff to lose his balance, 
fall from the seat of said tractor and strike his head upon 
the aforesaid cement pavement." 
National City has an ordinance reading "An ordinance 
prohibiting the displaying for sale, offering for sale, or selling 
of goods, wares or merchandise of any kind upon any public 
street or alley within the City of National City, California, 
and prohibiting the obstruction of any street or alley, or por-
tion thereof, or the sidewalk's face thereof, within said City, 
by placing '01' permitting thereon any signs, boxes, or other 
thing or article which will in any way obstruct or hinder the 
use thereof or travel thereon within the limits of said City." 
The court found that defendant violated the ordinance; that 
the maintenance by' defendant of the pile of crates constituted 
a nuisance; and that defendant negligently left the crates 
on the parking and proximately caused the injury to plaintiff. 
.... 
) 
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Defendant concedes it had no right to place the crates on 
the parking and that it was a trespass and probably negligcnce 
to do so, but it urges, that the acts and omissions on its part 
were not the proximate canse of the accident becanse the 
trial court found that it did not move the two crates which 
caused the accident to the two-foot strip and it is unknown 
how they got there; that if some independent intervening 
agency caused them to reach that place defendant is not liablc 
for the reason that the chain of causation was broken; and 
that the maintenance by it of the pile of crates on the parking 
was not a nuisance or a violation of the ordinance. 
[la] Disregarding the ordinance and the finding by the 
court of the existence of a nuisance. the trial court was jus-
tified in concluding that the defendant wa!< ne~ligent and that 
such negligence was the proximate (,:ln8e of the accident. 
Leaving those crates on the parking for a month or more 
unguarded, unattended and not properly inspected would be 
such conduct 8..<; would justify 8. finding of negligence by the 
trier of fact. Under the circumstances here presented the 
question of negligence and legal or proximate cause are 
closely related, assuming the test for both is whether a man 
of ordinary prudence should have foreseen or anticipated that 
the two crates might reach the spot where they were located 
on the two-foot strip. (See Prosser on Torts, pp. 364 et seq.) 
[2] It is well settled that one test for determining the issue 
of nt!gligence is whether a person of ordinary prudence should 
have foreseen or anticipated that someone might be injured by 
llis action or nonaction. (19 Cal.Jur. 583, 563-4; 1 Shearman 
& Redfield on Negligence, § 24.) Or as stated in different 
terms: "Negligent conduct may be either: (a) an act which 
the actor as a reasonable man should realize as involving an 
unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of 
another; or, (b) 8 failure to do an act which is necessary for 
the protection or assistance of another and which th2 actor 
is under a duty to do." (Rest., Torts, § 284.) And "The 
actor should recognize that his conduct in,ol,es 8 risk ot. 
~ausing an invasion of another's interest. if a person, (8) pos-
sessing such perception of the surrounding circumstances as 
a reasonable man would have, ot' lffich superior perception 
I.I.S the actor himself has, and (b) possessing such knowledge 
oJ other pertinent matters as a reasonable man would have 
of such superior knowledge as the actor himseli has, and 
l\lar.1U40 j MOSI"EY 1'. A1WEl\ FAHJI1:'; Co. 
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(c) correlating such perception and knowledge with reason-
able intelligence and judgment would infer that the act cre-
ates an appreciable chance of causing such invasion." (Rest., 
Torts, § 289.) The actor is bound to know "the qualities and 
habits of human beings and animals and the qualities. char-
llctcristics and capacities of things and forces in so far as 
they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in 
the community." (Rest., Torts, § 290.) 
[3] Whether or not the test has been met is generally 
one of fact for the trier of fact. .As recently expressed 
by this court: 
"In other words, the actor's conduct' must always be 
gauged in relation to all the other material circumstances 
surrounding it and if such other circumstances admit of. 
a reasonable doubt as to whether such questioned conduct 
falls within or without the bounds of ordinary care then 
such doubt must be resolved as a matter of fact rather 
than of law." (Toschi v. Christian, 24 Ca1.2d 354, 360 
[149 P.2d 848].) (See, also, 19 Cal.Jur. 719, 723.) 
[lb] Looking at the circumstances in the ease at bar, we 
finel crates piled three or four high on a parking near a side-
walk without right or authority, and left there for at least a 
month without regard to the condition of the pile. The side-
walk has considerable pedestrian traffic upon it. There is a 
school ground nearby. The two crates which caused the acd-
dent were directly across the sidewalk from the pile of crates, 
only five or six feet away. Under those circumstances we 
cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court was not jus-
tified in deciding that defendant as a person of ordinary pru-
dence should have anticipated or foreseen that the crates 
might become scattered, that some might fall off of the pile 
during the course of time, and possibly on the sidewalk, from 
whence a passerby might naturally push them aside to their 
ultimate resting place, or that they might be moved by school 
children. Presumably defendant's delivery man knew of the 
presence of the school, having served the community for some ... 
time. The. evidence shows that one of defendant's employees 
saw glass along the two-foot strip which would indicate that 
the crates or the contents had been tampered with. If defend-
ant had used due care and inspected the pile of crates or 
removed it (it having left them there for over a month), the 
two displaced crates probably would have been discovered. 
) 
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When the crates became scattered and hidden in the weeds 
they would be a danger to anyone lawfully using the area. 
[4] Viewing the issue as one of proximate or legal cause, 
and conceding there was some intervening agency in the chain .\ 
of causation, such agency was not a supersesding one exonerat-
ing defendant, because, as we have seen, what occurred was 
reasonably forseeable, and should haye been anticipated. 
Certainly, when that is tru~ the intervening agency does 
not break the chain of causation. The consequences of de-
fendant's act were natural and probable. In Katz v. Helbing, 
215 Cal. 449 [10 P.2d 1001], defendant, a contraetor en-
gaging in erecting a structure on a city lot, pursuant to a 
permit from the city, placed a box of lime partly on the 
sidewalk and partly on the street. Two boys playing with 
the lime. threw some of it at a passing streetcar injuring 
the plaintiff who was a passenger thereon. Judgment for 
plaintiff was affirmed, this court stating at page 451: 
"This practice [placing building materials in the street], 
under ordinary circumstances, is recognized as lawful by cus-
tom and judicial decision. But if experience had demonstrated 
that the placing of building materials in public streets and 
sidewalks was likely to be attended by accidents to persons 
lawfully using said streets and sidewalks, whether by virtue 
of wrongful acts of interference of young chadren or other-
wise, we might expect to find the matter regulated by statute. 
and in the absence of statutory prohibitions it would be the 
duty of courts and juries to declare such conduct wrongful if 
a reasonably prudent man would have foreseen that injury 
would probably result, for the acts of a defendant are deemed 
the proximate cause of such consequences as a reasonably pru-
dent man would anticipate as likely to result therefrom. . . . 
Intervening wrongful acts of third persons, but for which 
injuries complained of would not have been received, ordi-
narily break the chain of causation, because they are not to 
be anticipated as probable consequences, but are occasional 
and exceptional results. But this is not always the case, 
especially where the acts of children of a nonresponsible 
age are involved. . . . 
"Tested by these principles, we think the record sufficiently 
supports the jury's verdict against the defendants. The box 
containing the lime was on the sidewalk and street, unguarded 
and practically' uncovered. There were no warning signs on 
or near it, and there was no watchman at the building. . •• 
"In our opiri.ion, however, it is not essential to the liability 
.... 
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of any of the defendants that they have had actual knowledge 
of the activitie~ of the children. We think there is no douht 
that the conduct of the parties who were responsible for allow-
ing this highly dangerous material t.o remain on the sidewalk 
uncovered, unguarded, and with no precautions t.aken to pre-
vent injury to members of the public, was negligent. We 
think it may also be said that the box with its material was 
attractive to small boys, and that defendantf< were charged 
with notice of the possibility of boys being allured by it and 
using it in a manner dangerous to others. Even if defendants 
knew nothing of the actl' of the children in the instant case 
they should have known, both from general experience and 
from the fact that the children had played with the material 
for days prior to the accident. Under all of the circumstances 
the jury might certain'ly find, as may be implied from the ver-
dict, that the <'onsequences in this case Rhould have been fore-
seen." (Emphasis added.) (See, also, Merrill v. Los Angeles 
Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499 [111 P. 534, 139 Am.St.Rep. 
135, 31 L.R.A.N.S. 559]; Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal.App. 
597 [161 P. 29]; Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87; Stasulat v. 
Pacific Gas &- Electnc Co., 8 Cal.2d 631 r67 P.2d 678]; ReRt., 
Torts, §§447-9, 452.) It has been tersely st.ated that: 
"If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act 
in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazard:;; 
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether in-
nocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does Dot 
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby." 
(Rest., Torts, § 449.) It has been held that the rules on the 
subject in the Re:;;tatement of Torts, sections 442-453, are 
applicable in thi:;; state. (Stasulat v. Pacific Gas &- Electric 
Co., 8 Cal.2d 631 [67 P.2d 678].) 
[6] Finally, the issue of proximate cause is essentially 
one of fact. (Fennessey v. Pacific Gas &- Electric Co., 20 
Ca1.2d 141 [124 P.2d 51]; 19 Ca1.Jur. 732-3.) 
[6] Particular reliance is placed by defendant upon 
Schwartz v. California Gas &- Electric Corp., 163 Cal. 398 
[125 P. 1044], where defendant negligently dropped an insu-
lator .on plaintiff's land and the latter's horse was injured 
when he came in contact with it. The court reversed a judg-
ment for plaintiff on the ground of an alleged erroneous in-
struction. The opinion contains the erroneous statement that: 
" 'an injury is not actionable which would not have resulted 
/ from the act of negligence, except for the interposition of an 
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independent cause.''' (P. 402.) Vlhile there are distin-
gUishing factors in the case at bar, the Schwartz case is 
out of harmony with the rules heretofore stated. It is not 
always true that an intervening agency will relieve de-
fendant of responsibility. For that renson it must be o\'er-
ruled. Likewise, Solomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal. 
App. 742 [206 P. 498); and Royal Ins. Co. v. Mazzei, 50 
CaJ.App.2d 549 [123 P.2d 586], are distinguishable, but 
appear to approve the rule in the Schwartz case. In that 
respect they are disapproved. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J .-1 concur in the judgment. It is my opinion 
that defendant's liability depends entirely upon whether it 
violated a duty of protecting the plaintiff from unreasonable 
risk of harm (See, Restatement: Torts, § 282) and that con-
sideration of the case in terms of proximate cause obscures 
the real issue. Moreover, I do not believe that "the issue 
of proximate cause is ordinarily one of fact." 
That plaintiff's harm was in fact caused by defendant's 
conduct there can be no doubt. Whatever the means by which 
the milk crates were moved from one place to the other, de-
fendant's leaving them in the parking was a substantial factor 
in bringing about the harm. (See, Restatement: Torts, § 431.) 
With that determined, the question of causation is settled. 
It remains to determine only whether the harm falls within 
the limits of defendant's legal responsibility for the conse-
quences of its conduct. In my opinion that determination is 
made once it is established that defendant's conduct was or 
was not wrongful with respect to the plaintiff; for the risk 
reasonably to be foreseen not only creates the liability but de-
fines its limits. (Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 
339,344,346 [162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253] ; Tullgren v. Amos-
keag Mfg. Co., 82 N.H. 268, 276 [133 A. 4, 46 A.L.R. 380] ; see, 
Polemis v. Furness, Withy & Co. [1921], 3 K.B. 560; Green, 
The Rationale of Proximate Cause, pp. 88, 118; Seavey, Mr. 
Justice Cardozo and The Law of Torts, 52 Harv.L.Rev. 372, 
381-390; Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat 
from "Rationalization," 6 U. of Chic. L.Rev. 36.) 
It must be reeognized, however, that the question of legal 
responsibility iI commonly considered in terms of "proximate 
/ 
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cause," wl;ieh is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of 
ell.wmtioll, but with the various considerations of policy that 
limit an aeto/s responsibility for the consequence..,; of his con· 
duct. (Sec, Prosser, Torts, pp. 311-313.) Although the dor· 
trineor proximate cause is ilesigned to fix tile limitations upon 
liability, it has not yet been so formulated as to have a fair 
degree of predictability in its application in marking the 
boundary between liability and nonliahility. The vag'lCness 
of the doctrine has been candidly admitted in the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Andrews in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. 
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 [162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253]; "A 
cause but not the proximate cause. What we do mean by the 
word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public 
policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines 
to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not 
logic. It is practical polities." It may well be that any case 
can be analyzed more clearly without applying the doctrine 
of "proximate cause." (See, Green, Merlov. Public Service 
Company-A Study in Proximate Cause, 37 m.L.Rev. 429~) 
In any event, application of the doctrine to cases like the pres-
ent one only leads to confusion, for the considerations that 
determine whether a defendant was negligent with respect to 
a plaintiff define the limits of his responsibility. "Almost 
inyariably these cases present no issue of causation in fact. 
~;ince the defendant has created a situation acted upon byan-
other force to bring about the result; and to deal with them 
hl terms of 'proximate cause' is only to avoid the real issue. 
The question is one of negligence and the extent of the obli-
gation: whether the defendant's responsibility extends to such 
interventions, which are foreign to the risk he has created. It 
might be stated as a problem of duti to protect the plaintiff 
against such an intervening cause. A decision that the de-
fendant's conduct is not the 'proximate cause' of the result 
means only that he has not been negligent at all, or that 
his negligence, if any, does not cover such a risk." (Pros-
ser, Torts, p. 367; Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., sup raj 
Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F.2d 767, 770; Waube 
v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613 [258 N.W. 497, 98 A.L.R. 
394]; BourhiLl v. Young [1942], 2 All Eng.Rep. 396; Du-
lieu v. White &. Sons [1901], 2 K.B. 669, 685.) 
When defendant in the present case left its crates unat-
tended on the parking, it created an unreasonable risk that 
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passage they obstructed. The risk reasonably to be foreseen 
included the possibility that the crates, left readily acces-
sible to the pasRing crowd day after day, would be moved 
about and become a hazard to persons not only on the street 
and sidewalk but on the other property in the vicinity of the 
parking. "The kind of harm which in fact happened might 
have been expected, though the precise manner in which it 
happened was determined by an extraneous accident. " (Pol-
lock, Law of Torts (9th ed.) , pp. 50-51; Stasulat v. Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co., 8 Ca1.2d 631, 637-638 [67 P.2d 678]; 
Reithard~ v. Board of Education, 43 Cal.App.2d 629, 635 [111 
P.2d 440] ; Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 
501, 517 [167 N.E. 235]; see, Bohlen, Studies In The Law 
of Torts, p. 8.) It is immaterial that an intervening force 
moved the crates and brought about the result, for defend-
ant's responsibility extended to such intervention. The pos-
sibility that third persons would move the crates was not so 
remote that it could not be regarded as part of the risk. De-
fendant 's negligence consisted in failing to protect plaintiff 
against that risk. (See, Prosser, Torts, pp. 355-357; Katz v. 
Helbing, 205 Cal. 629 [271 P. 1062, 62 A.L.R. 825]; Merrill 
v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499, 505 [111 P. 
534, 139 Am.St.Rep. 135, 31 L.R.A.N.S. 559]; Nason v. Lord-
Merrow Excelsior Co., 92 N.H. 251, 253 [29 A.2d 464]; Gui-
nan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., supra, at p. 517; Syca-
more Preserve Works v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 366 TIL 11 
[7 N.E.2d 740, 111 A.L.R. 1133]; Lawrenceburg v. Lay, 149 
Ky. 490 [149 S.W. 862, Ann.Cas. 1914A, 1194, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 
480] ; Shanley v. Hurley, 96 Vt. 119 [117 A. 250, 23 A.L.R. 
261]; cf. Stultz v. Benson uumber Co., 6 Cal.2d 688, 695 [59 
P.2d 100]; see, Restatement, Torts, § 302, comment (I), 
§§ 447-449, 452 ; 25 Cal.L.Rev. 247; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 70.) This course of reasoning departs from the accustomed 
one only because of the continuing confusion engendered by 
the doctrine of proximate cause. No rules of property are 
disturbed; this field of law is not one in which people enter 
into transactions in reliance on past decisions. In all prob-
ability the general expectation is the reasonable one that in 
time the courts will dispel the mists that have settled on the 
doctrine of proximate cause in the field of negligence. 
If, however, the extent of defendant's liability is deter-
mined in terms of "proximate cause" it should be recognized 
that the issue presented is one of law. Whether a defendant's 
" 
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conduct is an actual cause of a pJaint.iff's harm is a question 
of fact, but the exiHtellcc and extcnt of a defendant's liability 
preHcnts a qucstion of law. (Sec, Restatement, Torts, § 453.) 
The diHtinction is important in determining the respective 
functions of court and jury and the scope of review by an 
appellate court. Ordinarily, the jury decides questions of 
fact and the court questions of law, but there are sometimes 
variations. (See, Thayer, Preliminary Tl'eatise on Evidence 
At The Common Law, pp, 185, 202; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d 
ed.), p. 500,) With respect to questions of fact the court 
reserves the power of deciding whether an issue should be 
presented to the jury: if reasonable men could not differ as 
to whether the evidence does or does not establish the exist-
ence of a fact, the court will not submit the issue to the jury. 
The determination of the standard of reasonable conduct by 
which a defendant's conduct is to be measured involves a 
question of law, a determination whether or not liability 
should be imposed, This question is nevertheless commonly 
left to the jury, although sometimes the formulation of th~ 
standard of reasonable conduct is taken over by an appellat(J 
court or provided for by legislation. (See, Clinkscales v. 
Carver, 22 Ca1.2d 72 [136 P.2d 777]; Sioux City & Pacific R. 
Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall (84 U.S.) 657, 664 [21 L.Ed. 745]; 
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417 [12 S.Ct. 679, 
36 L.Ed. 485); Restatement, Torts, § 285; Holmes, The Com-
mon Law, pp. 120-129; Holmes, Law in Science and Science in 
Law, 12 Harv.L.Rev. 443, 457.) In so far as the issue of "prox-
imate cause" is concerned with the existence of a duty or 
with limitations imposed upon liability as a matter of public 
policy, the issue is for the court. In so far as it is concerned 
with the foreseeability of the particular risk or the reason-
ableness of defendant's conduct with respect thereto in doubt-
ful cases, the issue is for the jury in the absence of standards 
imposed by the Legislature or an appellate court. (See, Re-
statement, Torts, § 453; Prosser, Torts, pp. 373-375; Stasulat 
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 8 Cal.2d 631,638 [67 P.2d 678].) 
Eilinonds, J., concurred. 
j,. 
